1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
2	HOUSTON DIVISION
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4	LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD AND 4:22-cv-03279 SMITH LLP
5 6	VS. HOUSTON, TEXAS
7	MICHAEL JOSEPH BITGOOD, ET AL. OCTOBER 6, 2022
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9	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING PROCEEDINGS
10	HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE KEITH P. ELLISON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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Official Court Reporter: David S. Smith, CSR, RPR, CRR Official Court Reporter United States District Court Southern District of Texas 515 Rusk Street, Room 8004 Houston, Texas 77002 david_smith@txs.uscourts.gov Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, transcript produced via computer.

PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon and welcome. 3 We're on the record in Lewis Brisbois versus 4 Bitgood. We'll take appearances of counsel beginning with the plaintiff, please. 5 6 MR. HELFAND: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 7 William Helfand, Bennett Fisher and Sean Braun for the 8 plaintiff. 9 THE COURT: Welcome. 10 MR. HELFAND: Thank you. 11 THE COURT: For defendants? 12 MR. BITGOOD: (No audio.) 13 THE COURT REPORTER: I am not hearing that person 14 Was that you, Mr. Beers? speak. 15 MR. BEERS: That was Mr. Bitgood. 16 This is Brad Beers. I'm pro se at the moment, 17 Your Honor. 18 MR. BITGOOD: I'm going to try again. Can you hear me 19 now? THE COURT REPORTER: Yes. If you get up close to the 20 21 mic, I can hear you. 22 MR. BITGOOD: Good afternoon, Your Honor. 23 Michael Bitgood appearing pro se. 24 MS. NORMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Susan Norman 25 appearing pro se for herself.

1 THE COURT: Does anybody else want to enter an 2 appearance, or are they just here for observation purposes? 3 MR. HELFAND: The other folks are either observing or 4 are witnesses, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Okay. We're here on plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. I will give plaintiffs ample 6 7 opportunity to speak; but before I do that, I need to hear from 8 defendants. I've not had a case like this before in my 23 9 years on the bench, and I guess I have questions more than 10 anything else as to how we ended up where we're ending up. 11 So if someone would like to speak to the issue of 12 the adoption of the law firm's name by the other side, I'd 13 welcome any insight. 14 MR. BITGOOD: Could I be heard, Your Honor? 15 THE COURT: Yes, you may. 16 MR. BITGOOD: Good afternoon. Your Honor, we did not 17 adopt the law firm's name. What we did is they allowed the 18 name Lewis Brisbois -- (Technical difficulty). 19 THE COURT REPORTER: Once again I am not hearing you, 20 sir. 21 THE COURT: You're not audible, Mr. Bitgood. 22 MR. BITGOOD: Is that better? 23 THE COURT: No. Do you have a hand instrument you can 24 pick up? 25 MR. BITGOOD: A telephone?

THE COURT: Yes. I'm not fluent in the technology of all of this. We're not hearing you.

MR. BITGOOD: Can anybody hear me now?

THE COURT: Yes, we can hear you now.

MR. BITGOOD: Okay. We'll go with this instead of that microphone.

May I proceed, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes, you may.

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MR. EASTON: Thank you, sir.

Your Honor, on March 9th of 2022 the Secretary of State publicly posted that the name Lewis Bisgaard & Smith was available because the plaintiff had not renewed their registration and elected to voluntarily relinquish that registration. At that point we had told the other side that if you weren't going to renew it, we would take it. I guess they took this as a joke. We took the registration, we did the filings, we paid the Secretary of State's fees and we didn't take the law firm's name. We took the name Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard because it seemed like a sound business investment at the time. We also facilitated the termination of a lawsuit that we had against their (Technical difficulty). After that lawsuit was going to be concluded -- sorry -- yes, I did get a telephone call from one of their partners saying, "Now that you won and you got everything you want, how about you give us back the name?"

I said, "Well, when we finalize the deal, we'll sit down and discuss it."

They were not interested in discussion. What they were interested in is fighting.

And so I asked them "Why don't you come to the mediation with Mr. Magenheim?"

They had no interest in going, so we settled the underlying lawsuit and the only issue left is this one.

This afternoon, Your Honor, they filed a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief in state court. The state court can declare who has the right to use the name based on the issue of the Secretary of State. Obviously we'll do whatever you tell us to do. This is not a fight that we really wanted, but we don't like being threatened and pushed around. That's why we're here. We just don't --

THE COURT: I understand that they may have let the registration lapse or decided affirmatively not to renew it, but why did you want to use the firm's name?

MR. BITGOOD: It seemed like a good business investment at the time, Judge. They voluntarily relinquished it. They had letters from the Secretary of State saying, "If you don't want this name anymore, don't renew it. It will become available; and if you do want it again, you're going to have to start all over again."

THE COURT: I understand that, but why did you want the

name? It doesn't seems like it has anything to do with what you're doing.

MR. EASTON: Sorry, Your Honor, you broke up. I got a squelch.

THE COURT: I understand that they may not have wanted the name, but why would you think it was yours to take? It seems like the firm had an institutional identity very different from your own. I don't understand why you wanted to use their name.

MR. EASTON: Your Honor, it seemed at the time -- it may not be sound at the time now -- to be a good business investment. We would open a mediation store and an arbitration store. But the firm is saying that they had this firm for 20 years. That's not true. We checked with the patent and trade office. They applied for the use of this name, Your Honor, on the very date they filed the lawsuit in your court. That would be September 23rd of 2022. It was available on the federal side; it was available on the state side.

THE COURT: I need to hear from the other side.

Mr. Helfand?

MR. HELFAND: Mr. Easton is not a lawyer, so perhaps the Court can excuse his misunderstanding of the law. And he hasn't answered the Court's question, but he has made a number of inaccurate statements. Mr. Easton, as Your Honor may know, has already been found to have committed bankruptcy fraud by

this Court, with Judge Hoyt presiding, and was sentenced to the federal penitentiary for that.

Mr. Easton has a number of other convictions for crimes of moral turpitude, which under 609 the Court could consider in determining his veracity. But he's either not being honest with the Court, or he just doesn't understand what he's saying. Either way, it's incorrect.

There is nothing from the Secretary of State that said the firm would forfeit the right to use the name Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith in its business. In fact, the Secretary of State doesn't have the authority to make that determination. What Your Honor has is a letter from the Secretary of State saying that the firm's payment to be listed as a foreign limited liability partnership to transact business would expire on March 9th.

On March 26th -- the Court also has this -- the Secretary of State's office -- I'm sorry.

On March 28th the Secretary of State's office acknowledged payment of a fee and issued a certificate of filing which specifically says that the firm has the authority to transact business in the state of Texas for the purpose set forth in the application under the name Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P.

Your Honor has that.

What Mr. Easton did is not until two months later

in May of 2022. May 26th he filed a -- Mr. Beers assisted him in filing a registration of a limited liability partnership by the same name as well as on May -- I'm sorry -- June 1st Mr. Easton filed, with Mr. Beer's assistance, an assumed name with the Secretary of State.

Now, what Mr. Easton is saying that's so very wrong -- and I think the Court was asking about this -- is under Section 5.001 of the Texas Business Organization Code, Section 5.001 specifically says that the filing of a certificate of formation of by an entity is not authority to use the name.

Here's the quote: "does not authorize the use of a name in this state in violation of the right of another under federal trademark" -- I'm paraphrasing now "federal trademark, Texas trademark law or the common law."

Mr. Easton also either falsely or inaccurately represents to the Court that Lewis Brisbois does not have a trademark, but Your Honor has these filed with the complaint. The firm has Trademark No. 3,722,172 filed on December 8th, 2009 -- not 2022 -- 2009, to use the name and the insignia Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., quote, for legal services, closed quote.

Now, if we need to get into it, the evidence will show that those legal services include arbitration and mediation services by attorneys throughout the country. As the

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Court knows -- and by the way, Judge, that's not the only filing that reserved that name. There's also the registration No. 5,151,128, registered on February 28th, 2017 -- 5,151,123 registered on February 28th, 2017.

So I don't know if Mr. Easton is just trying to defraud the Court like he's done before or if he just doesn't understand what he's saying; but the name has been on file and, as the Court knows, filing with the USPTO demonstrates secondary meaning. However, if the Court would like, I'm quite prepared to demonstrate that the name Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., has obtained secondary meaning under the laws of trademark, including the United States Supreme Court's recognition of the name Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., identifying a law firm of over 1600 lawyers, close to 4,000 employees who practice law in 60 offices in America constituting what, from time to time, is usually the fifth, sixth, seventh or eighth largest law firm in America. Mr. Easton is using a confusing name is undeniable. He's using the identical name. That he did it for purposes of creating confusion is equally undeniable because, as I provided to the Court, in a Law 360 article, which the Court has, in answering the question of why Mr. Easton registered this name, he said, quote -- one moment here, Judge.

On September 26th in a Law 360 online article
Mr. Easton said: "I don't like the way they treated us. I

don't like the pranking" -- this is what the article said -"Bitgood said, when asked why he'd registered the Lewis
Brisbois name."

Now, Ms. Norman is also using the Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith name; and she is identifying, as the Court has seen, herself as an attorney and certified mediator under that name. That also violates State Bar Rule 7.01 as it applies to an attorney. Mr. Bitgood, who has never been an attorney obviously, isn't in violation of that rule.

I'm fully prepared to put on the evidence necessary to obtain a preliminary injunction, Your Honor; but I think what would be most fair and most expeditious would be for the Court to enter a temporary restraining order which precludes these folks from using that name in any way, which is the last peaceable condition, and allow us some expedited discovery to determine the nature, extent and purpose of the defendant's use of my law firm and client's registered and recognized trademark and then come back for a preliminary injunction hearing if that's appropriate after doing that discovery. If Mr. Bitgood intends to make good on his proposal to stop infringing, we would have the opportunity to have that discussion with him.

But it has nothing to do with the underlying lawsuit, Your Honor; and it has nothing to do with registering with the State of Texas to conduct business. It has -- because

the State of Texas does not authorize one to use a name in trade. It simply registers a business to do business in accordance with the laws of the State of Texas. Again, to the extent that the Court has the opportunity, I think you'll find the answer to that question in 5.001 of the Business Organizations Code.

THE COURT: Mr. Helfand, tell me the status of the underlying case.

MR. HELFAND: Say again, sir.

THE COURT: Tell me the status of the underlying case.

MR. HELFAND: I am informed that the underlying case has been resolved by -- well, so here's the -- the underlying case was Mr. Easton and Mr. Jones bringing an action against a landlord and others based upon an eviction. My partner, David Oubre, appeared in that case to defend that lawsuit. Mr. Bitgood filed a motion to challenge Mr. Oubre's authority to represent the defendants in that case. About the same time Mr. Bitgood amended the petition -- Mr. Bitgood and Mr. Jones amended the petition for the purpose of seeking a declaratory judgment that Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith lacks authority to practice law in Texas, even though, as the Court knows, law firms don't practice law in Texas; so ostensibly Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith somehow lacks authority to operate as a business in Texas and that Mr. Oubre lacks authority to practice law in Texas.

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So Mr. Oubre withdrew as having a conflict of interest, and another lawyer was appointed to represent the original defendants. The original defendants and Mr. Easton reportedly did have a mediation at which the original defendants and Mr. Easton reached an agreement. That agreement did not include my law firm or my partner, Mr. Oubre; so I don't know what's happened to that. But to the extent that Mr. Easton filed a declaratory judgment action -- and Mr. Jones -- against my law firm and my partner as to their authority to conduct business and, in Mr. Oubre's case, to practice law in Texas, we have responded with a counterclaim of a declaratory judgment that they are authorized under the law to do those things. So where we are is I don't know if Mr. Bitgood and Mr. Jones have nonsuited or otherwise resolved their claims against the other defendants, but I'm told they've reached an agreement that would include doing that.

THE COURT: Ms. Norman, I did see stationery where you appear to list yourself as a lawyer for Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith.

MS. NORMAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Is that an error?

MS. NORMAN: I'm an attorney and I'm representing the Texas L.L.P., but I would appreciate the opportunity to correct something that Mr. Helfand failed to tell the Court.

THE COURT: Could you answer my questions first? Why

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are you best listing yourself on law firm stationery as a member? MS. NORMAN: As a member? THE COURT: As a member of the firm, yes. MS. NORMAN: I'm a member of the mediation and arbitration -- the firm was -- the L.L.P. for Texas was formed to do mediations and arbitrations, and I'm a member. I'm a partner in that firm. THE COURT: Which firm is that now? MS. NORMAN: Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., filed in Texas on March the 26th of this year. How long have you been a partner there? THE COURT: MS. NORMAN: Since March the 26th. THE COURT: Do you have membership in any other firms? MS. NORMAN: No, sir, other than my own sole practice as a lawyer. THE COURT: Have you during your career listed yourself as a member of any other firm? MS. NORMAN: No, sir. THE COURT: Why did you do it with Lewis Brisbois? MS. NORMAN: For the same reason that Mr. Bitgood is stating. When I -- I have a practice, and I have had a practice for many years of reviewing filings of opposing entities. I found that in the filings of Mr. Oubre in the underlying case, when he filed the original answer on March the 11th, the law firm Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith was not authorized to conduct business in Texas because it had voluntarily relinquished its right to do so, making the filings by Mr. Oubre on behalf of the plaintiffs void filings.

THE COURT: Whether they are properly registered or not, what makes you think you can use the name for yourself?

MS. NORMAN: Because it was available.

THE COURT: Weren't you concerned about the prospect of confusion?

MS. NORMAN: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Weren't you concerned about the prospect of confusion?

MS. NORMAN: No, sir, because all of the service mark registration that we've looked up for the USPTO, they're -- they don't have mediation and arbitration shown on their -- as part of their service mark. One thing that I think is very important, if the Court will allow me, Exhibit 1, as stated by Mr. Helfand, filing 3,722,172, for the forename Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, he did not tell the Court that on July the 10th, 2020, that name was canceled by the U.S. Patent and Trade Office. That name -- they have no rights under the USPTO filings, so far as I can find, to that name. They let it go. What they filed on September 23rd was a two-word service mark "Lewis Brisbois."

THE COURT: I don't understand. Whatever happened with

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their name, whether it lapsed or somehow it was discontinued, I don't understand why you can claim that name. MS. NORMAN: Because it's available. THE COURT: Well, that's not the test for naming rights and --MR. BITGOOD: Judge, may I inject something that may help us all? If we agree to quit right now, will they agree to quit and we leave them alone and can we give them back the name? THE COURT: You probably need some time to discuss I'm still very puzzled at why --MR. BITGOOD: I can see the Court is concerned about this and I don't think it's going the way I wanted it to go and I can tell from reading between the lines that it's best sometimes to just, as you once said in your memorandum, we live on a small planet. Quoting JFK, there's better things to do than fight, fight, fight. THE COURT: I agree this needs to be resolved. I agree with that. MR. BITGOOD: Well, if they would agree right now on your record to leave us alone, we would leave them alone and do a wind-down and close our shop if that is acceptable to them. THE COURT: Does Lewis Brisbois want some time to discuss that?

MR. HELFAND: First I need to respond to something

Ms. Norman said. We've got to get away from this term
"voluntarily relinquished." There is no evidence the firm
voluntarily relinquished anything. We were late on repaying
the registration with the Secretary of State. We'll take full
responsibility for that. That is not a relinquishment of the
name. Also Ms. Norman, as a lawyer, should be ashamed to tell
the Court that that somehow makes a trademark name available.
The Secretary of State says they don't make names available.
In fact anyone today could go register Lewis Brisbois
Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., in addition to everybody else who is
registered with the Secretary of State. Ms. Norman is just
flat wrong about that, and I'll take that up also with the bar.

That said, to respond to Mr. Easton's proposal, here is what I suggest. If the defendants will agree to a temporary restraining order that temporarily precludes them from publishing the name Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., for the next 14 days, I would be happy to work with the defendants to try to reach a resolution. Oh, and expedited discovery if we can't reach an agreement, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Easton?

MR. EASTON: The proposition that we put on the table is we will relinquish the name right here before you right now.

MR. HELFAND: There's more to it than that, Judge. We have damages. There's the potential for statutory damages, and we've got to resolve some related issues. So it's not as

simple as Mr. Easton proposes; but since he's willing to relinquish it right now, if he'll agree and the other three defendants will agree not to use the name again for the next 14 days while we discuss resolution, I'm happy to do that.

MR. BITGOOD: Your Honor, may I bring to the Court's attention, since Mr. Helfand says they're seeking damages and everything --

THE COURT: Is this Mr. Easton?

MR. BITGOOD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. EASTON: May I bring to the Court's attention, please, a counterclaim seeking relief of damages and attorney's fees down in the state court in rem proceeding. We may be wholly and totally wrong for whatever reason; but I'm on the record now telling you if that's what we did, we're willing to resolve it. No more maneuvers. If they really want to resolve the thing, they'll say they agree not to do it. Your Honor, I'm in front of a federal judge. Do they think I'm going to tell you something and turn around and do something else?

MR. HELFAND: Well, that is what happened with Judge Hoyt, but that's a story for a different time.

MR. BITGOOD: What are you talking about with Judge Hoyt?

MR. HELFAND: Judge, my offer stands. If Mr. Easton is sanguine in his proposal, then he and his fellow defendants

should agree to a temporary restraining order, give us time to negotiate a complete resolution and, failing that, an opportunity to do discovery and come back to the Court with a more fulsome preliminary injunction.

Because here's the thing. I appreciate Mr. Easton's acknowledgment. I'm going to have no problem proving this name belongs to a law firm of 1600 lawyers in 59 offices across the United States. Its has acquired secondary meaning beyond anybody's wildest dreams, and the registration and use of the identical name is clearly an effort to confuse the community. And by the way, I've got the city attorney of the City of Sugar Land on who's already prepared to testify that Mr. Easton's letters to her on my firm's letterhead is that confusion.

So I'm happy to try to work it out, but I'm not going to do it on terms dictated by Mr. Easton right here and now. Whether by agreement, Your Honor, or by the Court's order I would respectfully request that the Court enter a temporary restraining order for 14 days, order expedited discovery if after the next three or four days we have not resolved this matter by agreement. I am not -- I do not believe my firm -- but I can't speak for my firm or this -- will hold up resolution based upon a claim for damages; but I can't make agreements with Mr. Easton right here and now. I answer to a management committee that's based throughout the country.

THE COURT: Do defendants oppose a 14-day temporary restraining order?

MR. BITGOOD: We do, Your Honor. We don't see the necessity of being enjoined when we're not going to do anything until we try to resolve this. What he wants is an order from this Court to go waving it around all over the place saying, "We beat them back."

MR. HELFAND: Judge, if I have compliance, I don't need to wave it anywhere; and I don't like when other lawyers, or in this case laypeople, tell me what they think I'm going to do. I am focused on solving this problem. It is a waste of time and significant resources of a big law firm that has other things to do. I believed Mr. Bitgood when he told Law 360 that he did it to screw with my law firm, and so far he's been successful. I'm happy to try to resolve it, but Mr. Bitgood is not going to dictate those terms here and now.

THE COURT: I really -- the only thing a judge brings to a case is neutrality. He doesn't bring nearly the knowledge that either side has. And I'm striving to be neutral here, but I still haven't understood why. Regardless of what went on in the Secretary of State's office, regardless of what oversights might have occurred in the offices of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, I don't understand why defendants ever had any right to use the firm's name. I've never seen a case like where one side uses another side's name to gain tactical advantage. It

doesn't compute to me.

And, Ms. Norman, I'd think you'd understand that.

MS. NORMAN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Do you understand -- do you have any basis for saying you have a right to use the law firm's name?

MS. NORMAN: Well, I looked at the history of relinquishment of that name -- the relinquishment of the name with the authority to do business in Texas multiple times. It looked like a voluntary relinquishment; and it looked like, as Mr. Easton said, a business opportunity. That's all it was.

The COURT: Well, if General Motors were to lapse in its registration, would you think you could call yourself "General Motors"?

MS. NORMAN: Depending upon the circumstances, Your Honor, possibly. If they lost the right to do business in Texas under that name, which is what Lewis Brisbois did when they lost the right.

MR. HELFAND: Judge, may I -- I need to hasten to point out that Ms. Norman's premise is absolutely false. Your Honor has it on March 28th the Secretary of State acknowledged payment for the foreign company Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, L.L.P., to conduct business in Texas. It wasn't until two months later that Ms. Norman and Mr. Easton, with Mr. Beer's complicity, registered the assumed name and then more than two months later that they created the company in the

exact same name. It's just a fact, Judge. Why Ms. Norman will not acknowledge a fact to the Court in violation of her duty to the Court makes no sense to me.

MS. NORMAN: In my duty to the Court, Your Honor, I will also acknowledge that starting in early May I began checking the website of the Secretary of State. I looked virtually every day. The -- what Mr. Helfand is saying about March 28th is because on June the 9th the Secretary of State accepted their filing, which may have been mailed in March 28th; but that was not on the website. That was not available to see and I spoke with the Secretary of State on June 9th and the filing number for their new application, which they say -- the Secretary of State stamped, backdated as to March 28th, is 9,342 or -24 numbers later than what we filed on May the 26th. So his statement that this happened --

MR. HELFAND: It doesn't explain the mistake of doing it -- Judge, it has nothing to do with the right to use the name; but even if Ms. Norman actually honestly believes that, she's already admitted she found out that the Secretary of State made an authorization for the firm to conduct business dated March 28th. So I could understand if she did something for a short time and then said, "Oops, now that I know the Secretary of State authorized your law firm to continue to conducting business as of March 28th, I'm going to stop doing this"; but a moment ago on the record she told you she still

has the right to do that. She doesn't as a matter of law.

MR. BITGOOD: Your Honor, I'd just like to be brief if you would allow me.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. BITGOOD: The Secretary of State maintains serial numbers for each filing as to who has the right to use a name. Now, I may be completely wrong and out of -- completely out of the water on this issue, because I can assure you this is my first time having engaged myself in this; but our number, our serial number, 804584868, we got approved to do business. That's the day we started. Their serial number, Your Honor, irrefutable before the Court, is 804594502. That comes 9,634 registrations with that name behind ours. We did it by the book. Now, if we are still wrong by having done it all by the book, I'm willing to surrender now. I raise the white flag before His Honor to terminate this thing.

THE COURT: I don't think the question of what happened to the Lewis Brisbois status in Texas has anything to do with the right of individuals not associated with the firm to use that name. Those are two entirely different concepts. Lewis Brisbois is far and away the senior user of the name and it has acquired secondary meaning and I don't think the consequence of a delay in paying a registration fee or renewal fee needs to result in anybody can then start practicing under that name. That's the part that puzzles me about this.

MR. BITGOOD: Well, it should puzzle you no more, Your Honor. I raise the white flag.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to enter a temporary restraining order to prevent further use of the name; and we'll have a 14-day period where parties can attempt to achieve a settlement that's documented in writing, and I hope that will then be the end of this case. It really is not a good use of anybody's time to be arguing about this, and I can only see further harm if the status quo is continued.

MR. BEERS: May I comment further on that issue, Judge?

THE COURT: Who's speaking, please?

MR. BEERS: Brad Beers.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.

MR. BEERS: In as much as it's never been alleged, I don't believe, that I've ever used that name, the allegation against me is that I filed a certificate of assumed name in the Secretary of State's office in a period when there was no registration on file. I would ask the Court to exclude me from that temporary restraining order. I have no intention of starting to use that name. I'm never used it, but I would just as soon not have a temporary restraining order against -- entered against me for what I did practicing law on behalf of Mr. Bitgood four months ago.

MR. HELFAND: Your Honor, Mr. Beer misstates allegations against him. Mr. Beers, who has had numerous cases

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with lawyers of Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, knowingly conspired with Mr. Easton and Ms. Norman to falsely appropriate the law firm's name. Mr. Beers voluntarily participated in that conduct. He's not sued just for filing something. sued for conspiring with the other defendants to misappropriate the law firm's name; and if he's not going to do it, then he should be part of the temporary restraining order telling him he can't. What I don't want to find out -- let me say this as to Mr. Beers. If he is stipulating on the record that he will comply with the TRO even if not named in the TRO, I will tell you on behalf of Lewis Brisbois excluding Mr. Beers by name is fine, although I think the TRO is going to say, "the defendants"; and Mr. Beers is and will be a defendant in this lawsuit if it's not resolved by agreement. But if it means something to Mr. Beers and the Court thinks it's appropriate to not name him individually as restrained, based upon his stipulation as a member of the bar of this Court, then I will agree that the Court need not name Mr. Beers. But if Mr. Beers does something further to impugn the name of the law firm or assist others in doing so, then I will ask the Court to hold him in contempt because Mr. Beers has a very misunderstood impression of why he's being sued. Mr. Beers knowingly, perhaps with greater knowledge than any other defendant, assisted others in appropriating my law firm's name; and Mr. Beers knew at all times during that -- because up until

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recently I counted Mr. Beers as a friend. He knew at all times he was doing that, that he was misappropriating the name of a going law firm that has 1600-plus lawyers around the country. THE COURT: I'm going to ask for each side to submit a proposed order by noon tomorrow. I'll decide, based on that, what the order is going to say. MR. HELFAND: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are there any questions? MR. HELFAND: Not from the plaintiffs, Judge. MR. BEERS: No. sir. MS. NORMAN: No, sir. THE COURT: Thank you. Yes? Yes? I can't hear you. MR. BITGOOD: I'm sorry, sir. Pending the Court entering this order, I would like to remind the Court we're not going to do anything in state court until you enter this order. THE COURT: Not going to do anything what? MR. BITGOOD: We're not going to do anything in the state court system until you enter this order. THE COURT: I can't control what happens in the state

THE COURT: I can't control what happens in the state court other than through the order I'm going to enter, and I would hope that those cases could be brought to an end contemporaneously with the resolution of this case.

MR. HELFAND: We share in your hope in that regard,

Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you very much. Thank you for your time, Judge. MR. HELFAND: MR. BEERS: Thank you. MR. EASTON: Thank you. (The proceedings were adjourned.) REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I, David S. Smith, CSR, RPR, CRR, Official Court Reporter, United States District Court, Southern District of Texas, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability and understanding, from the record of the proceedings in the above-entitled and numbered matter. /s/ David S. Smith_ Official Court Reporter